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STRATEGIC RISK MANAGEMENT

A Better Way of
Managing Major Risks
By PHILIP BROMILEY and DEVAKI RAU

F

ew companies invested more effort
in risk management than Countrywide Financial. In 2007, the Institute of Internal Auditors praised
Countrywide for its comprehensive enterprise risk management program, which involved 45 risk management professionals,
supplemented by 112 internal auditors, assessing 530 risk matrices, 9,500 risks and
27,000 controls. “Countrywide’s program is
truly best practice,” stated Internal Auditor
magazine at the time.
A year after that glowing pronouncement,
Countrywide was acquired by Bank of America
in 2008, having essentially gone bankrupt due
to unwise risk-taking in the subprime lending
market. How could a company with such an
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exhaustive system of risk identification, assessment and evaluation succumb to the very
thing that it had gone to such lengths to avoid?
Our observations of risk-management
practices point to a critical problem: managers often turn risk management into a massive paper-processing exercise. They become
so busy identifying and evaluating every possible kind of risk facing their businesses that
they miss the forest for the trees.
Instead, we believe that managers should
focus on the risks that really matter – namely,
strategic risks that threaten their firm’s existence. In this article, we suggest a different
way to identify and manage risk, offering nine
practical tips to help you manage your risks
strategically.
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Do firms want – or even need – to enumerate and
evaluate each and every risk they could possibly face?
Or do they just care about the big ones that might cause
them to go bankrupt or face serious distress?
Enterprise Risk Management:
An Imperfect Science

Conventional wisdom on risk management
suggests that firms manage their risks most effectively when they consider them as a portfolio. As portfolios generally have less risk than
the underlying components, managing risks
this way can result in lower risk-mitigation
costs than managing risks individually.
For example, one business division might
have a positive exposure to an exchange rate
and another a negative, but taken together, the
two could cancel each other out, leaving no
corporate exposure to that exchange rate.
However, the risk of a portfolio depends
critically on the correlations among the risks.
Combining highly correlated risks offers little
benefit in a portfolio, while combining uncorrelated risks can result in a portfolio risk far
below the risk of its constituent parts.
This approach – termed Enterprise Risk
Management or ERM – involves assessing
all the risks facing a firm, classifying them by
their probability and impact, and determining
which actions to take to mitigate or control
them. A firm might identify operational risks
at the subsidiary level, the business unit level

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In trying to identify all the
risks a firm faces, managers
can turn risk management into
an overwhelming paper-processing exercise that distracts
them from focusing on the risks
that really matter – namely,
strategic ones that threaten the
firm’s existence. By not being
able to grasp the assumptions
and limitations of complex and
costly Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) tools and models,
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managers may be operating
under a false sense of security.
Based on their research on firm
risk-taking and risk management, the authors offer nine
practical suggestions to help
managers make the risk function more meaningful and
relevant. A healthy dose of
skepticism, prudence and resilience will go a long way toward
helping your firm see the forest
rather than the trees.

and the division level. After identifying these
risks, the firm would assess the likelihood and
consequence of their occurrence. It would
then identify how to respond to these risks in
the context of the firm’s internal environment,
control systems, communication processes
and so on.
Note that not all risks need to be treated as
something to be mitigated or controlled. A firm
with an advantage in addressing a specific kind
of risk should explore ways to profit from that
advantage.
Although attractive in principle, this approach has problems. First, ERM entails enormous effort. The job of identifying risks arising
from firm operations at a variety of levels can
be an immense undertaking.
Take the three-dimensional matrix or risk
cube (see Exhibit 1) frequently used to depict
the various interrelated levels of risk facing an
enterprise. The eight main components of risk
times the four categories of business objectives
times the four business levels yield 128 different managerial considerations – and that’s just
for one kind of risk! Because there are so many
enterprise risks, a firm can easily identify tens
of thousands of potential risks, like Countrywide did.
And that’s only the start. Next, managers
need to assess the likelihood and consequence
of those risks occurring. To handle these risks
as a portfolio requires that managers know the
distributions and correlations of the possible
outcomes. Outside of financial investments,
managers seldom have sufficient data for
these estimates. Often, the most they can do is
guess the likelihood of a risk occurring on, say,
a scale of 1 to 5. The benefits of treating risks as
a portfolio depend on the correlations among
the underlying risks, yet managers seldom have
legitimate data to estimate such correlations
accurately or meaningfully.
Finally, managers should ask the same
question about ERM that they would ask about
IESEinsight
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any other business practice: what is the return
on investment for this activity?
We have little evidence that ERM practices
actually reduce risk, let alone justify the cost
of implementing ERM practices. Any manager
can take steps to reduce risk. But the real management challenge lies in judging the tradeoffs between risk reduction vs. reduction in
expected performance.

Strategic Risks: A Different
Approach

Given the inherent difficulty, if not impossibility, of ever fully identifying, assessing and
evaluating all the risks that could ever have an
impact on your business, we would argue that
managers would do better to focus on strategic risks – those that pose the biggest threats
to your company’s existence.
This shift of emphasis comes from an examination of what firms really want from risk
management. Do firms want – or even need – to
enumerate and evaluate each and every risk the
firm could possibly face? Or do firms just care
about the big risks – the ones that might cause
the firm to go bankrupt or face serious distress?
Let us distinguish between strategic and
operational risks. Put simply, managers must

The Standard
Risk Cube

EXHIBIT 1

THIS COMMONLY USED ERM TOOL YIELDS 128
DIFFERENT CONSIDERATIONS PER RISK.
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address strategic risks because they threaten
the performance or survival of the firm, whereas managers should address operational risks
when doing so improves expected returns.
Take a banking example. On the one hand,
a bank need not be overly afraid of the risk per
se associated with small loans (an operational
risk) – though it should be concerned that the
interest rate charged is sufficient that the loan
has positive expected returns. On the other
hand, the bank should worry about the overall
risk of its loan portfolio or its trading activities
because either of those constitutes a strategic
risk that could kill the bank.
Likewise, in a production environment,
the defect rate is a form of operational risk
that should be managed when it pays to do so,
but major product liability issues are strategic
risks that could seriously damage the company.
Most firms really want risk management
to help the firm avoid crises that threaten its
survival. However, barring regulators and consultants, risk management is probably not the
single most urgent or pressing concern weighing on managers’ minds. Profits probably matter more, since profits are real while risks are
only estimates.
Moreover, the central ideas underlying the
concept of risk are rather slippery. For example, how does one define “risk”? Is it the size of
potential loss, the probability of potential loss
or some combination of the two? Do your risk
estimates depend on historical data (assuming
such data exist) or the gut feelings of your managers? If your risk estimates depend heavily on
managerial judgment, they will almost always
be biased.
Forecasting is a case in point (after all, a
risk assessment is essentially a forecast of
risk). While forecasting can be quite accurate
in well-understood, repeatable environments,
it can be quite problematic in novel or less understood domains. The track record for new
product introductions suggests that 9 out of 10
fail, but 10 out of 10 were predicted to succeed.
Likewise, most observers estimate that 5 out
of 10 corporate acquisitions fail, when again 10
out of 10 were predicted to succeed, at least by
the managers who made those decisions.
There is no reason to believe that managers are better at estimating risks than they are
at forecasting other non-repeated items like
these. Even ignoring the distorting effect of
ISSUE 28 FIRST QUARTER 2016
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Even if your firm could collect accurate data, free from
any bias, you would still face the problem of what to do
with such information. Few managers have the expertise
and competence to estimate risk from these data.
incentives and organization-specific issues,
research on behavioral decision theory consistently demonstrates that people, including
professional analysts, are terrible intuitive
statisticians. Depending on extraneous factors, they systematically over- or underestimate the likelihood that a particular outcome
will occur.
Even if your firm could collect relatively
accurate data, free from any managerial bias,
you would still face the problem of what to do
with such information. Few managers have the
technical expertise and competence required
to identify and use the right tools to estimate
risk from these data.
Given that managing risk has both direct
costs (in forgone earnings) and indirect costs
(in managerial time), executives need to think
long and hard about how much risk management they need. Rather than trying to identify
and manage a host of risks, you may be better
off focusing on the strategic ones that could
potentially sink your firm (see Exhibit 2). Here
we offer nine tips to help you do that.
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1 RECOGNIZE WHERE THE REAL PROBLEM LIES

Sometimes the problem is not risk management but management. Many observers attribute the recent financial crisis to inadequate
risk management by banks and other financial
institutions. In some cases, however, the problem was not risk management per se but management decisions that ignored or overruled
warnings from the risk management function.
As previously mentioned, Countrywide had
an extremely sophisticated risk management
system. But it was Countrywide’s management
who publicly stated that the company would
match any loan made by a competitor.
The same goes for New Century Financial,
another big provider of subprime mortgages in
the United States. In their article “New Century Financial: Lessons Learned,” Michael J. Missal and Lisa M. Richman note that it wasn’t that
the risks weren’t being detected: they were. “In
fact, a number of board members were openly disdainful of certain members of senior
management, and challenged their integrity
and competence.” The “unhealthy friction”
between the board and senior management
“inhibited an open flow of information … and
restricted the ability of New Century to react
nimbly and effectively to the rapidly deteriorating subprime market.” Internal auditors at
New Century repeatedly objected to the riskiness of the loans being made, but management
did not respond.
2

BE SKEPTICAL OF SOPHISTICATED
RISK MODELS

Wall Street banks, among the most sophisticated risk managers in the world, led us into
the 2008 recession. These banks may have
taken too many risks with subprime mortgages
precisely because they relied on sophisticated
risk-management systems that used formal,
extremely elaborate models. These models
gave managers an unjustified sense of security
IESEinsight
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Sophisticated models may appear to make uncertainty
magically disappear – particularly when the managers
who use them gloss over or view with unquestioning
reverence the details of the underlying analyses.
Not All Risks Are Equal

EXHIBIT 2

THIS IS A LIST OF 50 RISKS IDENTIFIED BY ONE
CONSULTANT. THE REAL QUESTION IS: WHICH OF
THESE ARE THE STRATEGIC ONES FOR YOU?

Strategic
Risks

Industry
Economy
Political Change
Competitors
Consumer
Preference
Market Share
Reputation
Brand Equity
Strategic Focus
Investor
Confidence

Operational
Risks

Customer
Satisfaction
Product Failure
Supply Chain
Sourcing
Supplier
Concentration
Outsourcing
Election Cycle
Catastrophic Loss
Process Execution
Policies and
Procedures
Environmental
Contract
Regulatory and Legal
Human Resources
Health and Safety
Authority
Integrity
Leadership and
Empowerment
Culture
Performance
Incentives
Knowledge Capital

Financial
Risks

Cash Flow
Liquidity
Availability
Interest Rates
Foreign Exchange
Rates
Credit Capacity
Credit Concentration
Credit Default
Accounting
Budgeting
Taxation
Pricing
Performance
Measurement
Portfolio
Systems
Infrastructure
Systems Access
Systems Availability
Data Integrity
Data Relevance

about their risk assessments.
Sophisticated models may appear to make
uncertainty magically disappear – particularly when the managers who use them gloss
over or view with unquestioning reverence
the details of the underlying analyses. Indeed,
Wall Street banks and investment firms were
hiring rocket scientists and similarly trained
individuals who, with a very limited understanding of the lending system, produced risk
IESEinsight

models that the average manager had little
chance of understanding.
Here’s a simple example: Suppose you make
10,000 products with a 5 percent chance of defects. Or you give out 10,000 loans with a 5 percent chance of default. Obviously, you would
expect 500 defects or defaults on average, but
how likely is it that you would encounter 600
or more defects or defaults?
If the defects or defaults are randomly distributed, the answer is .00045 percent. In other
words, if you assume a 5 percent defect rate or
default probability, your models will assure
you that the chance of you seeing 600 defects
or defaults is virtually nil.
However, this analysis rests heavily on an
assumed defect rate of 5 percent. If you err a
little in predicting the defect rate, and the true
defect rate is 6 percent, then 600 moves from
impossible to the most likely outcome.
A similar problem occurs with independence. If borrowers default on loans randomly, then the estimate holds. But if these were
home loans and some defaults lower the value
of houses, thereby triggering more defaults
as individuals with financial troubles can no
longer sell their homes, then defaults are not
independent. Likewise, if machines make defects randomly, we have a good estimate, but
if one malfunctioning machine results in many
defects, then defects are correlated.
Few managers have the technical ability
or time to evaluate risk-assessment models in
depth. As a poor substitute, they should at least
be skeptical.
3 BEWARE OF INCREASING RISK FOR PROFIT

One of the major problems with strategic risks
is that they occur infrequently. If they didn’t,
we would see a high percentage of firms going
bankrupt every year. We have great difficulty
estimating the probabilities of infrequent
events.
ISSUE 28 FIRST QUARTER 2016
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The point is not to develop detailed plans for every
scenario, but to highlight major environmental risks in
general, so that you can at least accommodate them in
your strategic planning.
How does this matter for organizations?
Consider a manager making decisions. If the
outcomes of his or her decisions are positive
(or at least nothing goes wrong), the manager
might see no harm in taking more risks the
next time. At an organizational level, markets
might push firms into increasing amounts of
risk, eventually making them take on as much
risk as their peers, just to stay in business. Incrementally, the manager or firm can increase
risk to undesirable levels.
In a safety example, NASA launches had indicators of design problems but nothing went
really wrong. Consequently, the organization
kept taking risks – until a manned mission
exploded.
In a banking example, before the crash,
if a mortgage lender was not as generous as
the most generous competitor in the market,
the lender did not make loans. Each time a
lender became more generous – by lowering
underwriting standards or increasing the loan
to house value – competitors were forced to
match. If they didn’t, they were essentially out
of business.
Before the crash, lenders made winking
references to “liar loans” (based on stated
income) and “NINJA loans” (No Income, No
Job or Assets) but a company that did not issue these had difficulty staying in the market.
Such creeping risk could occur in a variety
of domains – from ancillary commitments
to product warranties to product quality,
where quality is not immediately evident to
the buyer.
4 TRY SCENARIOS

One approach to identify strategic risks is
scenario analysis. You start by identifying
a few key variables on which there is uncertainty. Then, you develop logically consistent scenarios based on the different values
of these key variables, and evaluate the major

20

FIRST QUARTER 2016 ISSUE 28

uncertainties in each case. Oil companies do
this to anticipate the impact of drastically different oil prices: what happens if crude is $50,
$100 or $150 per barrel?
If you use scenarios to assess strategic
risks, be aware of the general tendency to underestimate the variability. In July 2014, when
crude cost $110 a barrel, few would have given
it much chance to be $30 a barrel by January
2016, but this happened.
The point is not to develop detailed plans
for every scenario, but to highlight major environmental risks in general, so that you can
at least accommodate them in your strategic
planning.

5 HOLD PREMORTEMS

In most companies, naysayers aren’t welcome.
People prefer can-do managers. If the senior
management team leans toward X, rare is the
person who will stick his head above the parapet to voice arguments against X. And if X turns
out to be wrong, no one likes the person who
says, “I told you so.”
Writing in Harvard Business Review, Gary
Klein proposes an alternative form of expressing concerns without becoming the smug
Monday-morning quarterback. The opposite
of a postmortem – in which problems are dissected after they’ve occurred, when hindsight
is always 20/20 – Klein’s premortem technique
encourages people to point out all the ways
that things could go wrong before any action
is taken.
Under this “prospective hindsight approach,” everyone assumes the failure of whatever is being proposed, and they spend their
time developing potential reasons for that
failure. With such reasons identified, managers can strengthen the plan. The premortem
helps overcome the tendency of managers always looking on the bright side.
IESEinsight
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Apart from excessive risk-taking, ill-conceived
incentives can provoke the opposite problem: risk
aversion. Managers will likely not take too many risks –
even risks the company might want to take.
6 USE EXTERNAL COMPARISONS

Most risk analyses focus on the issue at hand
and attempt to predict the future outcomes
for that particular issue. However, such predictions often have systemic biases. Most of
us are familiar with the tendency to underestimate how long tasks will take and how much
they will cost. Much of this comes from estimating the minimum expected time, if everything goes according to plan, and not the actual
expected time.
Managers can combat this tendency by using a comparable reference group. In estimating how long a project should take, create a list
of roughly similar projects and look at how long
they took. In estimating costs, do the same
thing. These comparisons do not even have
to be terribly close. Then you can adjust from
your normal prediction, recognizing how long
similar things have historically taken and how
much they have cost.
7 PAY ATTENTION TO INCENTIVES

Risks in general, and strategic risks in particular, stem from managerial decisions that depend heavily on incentives. While incentives
have clear benefits, sometimes they work too
well, especially when they are strong and the
risk associated with the action is unmeasured
or unmonitored.
Securities trading is a prime example. Successful risk-taking can result in hefty bonuses
for individual traders, while the company
bears the losses associated with unsuccessful
risk-taking. An employee who has lost enough
to end his or her career may take excessive
risks, believing he or she has nothing to lose.
Several banks have been destroyed by individuals doubling-down on small losses to create
catastrophes.
Apart from excessive risk-taking, ill-conceived incentives can provoke the opposite
IESEinsight

problem: risk aversion. In most companies, the
middle manager who takes a big risk that pays
off may get a nice bonus and perhaps a promotion, but if it turns out badly, he or she may get
fired. With that kind of reward system, sensible
managers will likely not take too many risks –
even risks the company might want to take.
8 DON’T FORCE GROWTH

Sometimes strategic risks stem from a company in a traditional industry setting extremely
aggressive growth targets, based not on sound
business logic but on arbitrary ambition. To
meet these targets, the firm may pursue acquisitions or other actions that increase its
strategic risks.
In their paper “Just Say No to Wall Street:
Putting a Stop to the Earnings Game,” Joseph
Fuller and Michael C. Jensen document the
case of Nortel Networks, which between 1997
and 2001 paid over $32 billion to acquire 19
companies in an attempt to satisfy analysts’
growth expectations. The telecom company’s
strategy was to transform itself from voice
transmission to data networking, but it overextended itself, fueled by heady market valuations. In the end, most of those acquired companies were sold, shut down or written off.
Nortel’s stock nosedived, it hemorrhaged staff
and by 2009, the company had gone bankrupt.
9 BUILD A RESILIENT ORGANIZATION

Most organizations face an untold number of
low-probability, high-impact events. Their
low probabilities make identification and
management of each potential event uneconomic and infeasible. That said, given the large
numbers of these potential events, the odds of
one of them occurring are quite high.
Instead of managing all these events, firms
must build a capability to respond to unanticipated events. In other words, they must build
ISSUE 28 FIRST QUARTER 2016
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To build a resilient organization, try to keep some
resources in reserve. In addition, have systems that
acknowledge and adapt to problems rather than hiding
them. This implies a culture of transparency.
a capacity for organizational resilience. Managers will always face surprises. Instead of trying
to anticipate all the low-probability but highimpact potential surprises, managers should
focus on building systems and processes that
allow their firms to recover quickly from them.
A legendary tale in this regard is the time
when lightning struck a Philips plant in March
2000, causing a damaging fire that interrupted the supply of chips for Ericsson and Nokia
cellphones. Though both Nokia and Ericsson
estimated a one-week delay in chip deliveries,
Nokia went further, holding daily discussions
with Philips engineers. In doing so, Nokia discovered that a week was an underestimate, and
it quickly sought alternative suppliers. By the
time Ericsson cottoned on, Nokia had locked
up most of the alternative suppliers. The endof-year results spoke for themselves: Ericsson
reported losses, blaming component shortages, while Nokia increased its handset market
share, thanks to quick thinking in the face of
a freak event.
To build a resilient organization, try to
keep some resources in reserve. Being too fat
is not good, but neither is having no fat. In addition, have systems that acknowledge and
adapt to problems rather than hiding them.
This implies a culture of transparency, so
that covering up problems becomes difficult.
Rather than scapegoating, firms need a culture
where people feel free to admit mistakes with
minimal fear of being penalized. Decentralization also allows adaptation to problems as and
when they occur.

completely eliminate risk – but we can build
adaptability and resilience into our organizations and management systems.
As a final thought, remember that if your
firm is in business today, it has survived the
worst recession since the Great Depression.
In other words, your firm has survived the
70-year storm. Rushing to reduce future risks
based on experience in the 2008 global financial crisis could easily result in overreaction
– an example of locking the barn door after
the horse has bolted. Indeed, if your firm did
not experience difficulties in the recession, it
probably was not taking enough risk. Instead
of rushing into a massive risk-management
exercise, try to target your risk management
activities to emphasize the strategic issues
that will determine organizational survival.

TO KNOW MORE

Draw on Past Experiences

Throughout this discussion, it’s important to
remember that while risks – strategic or otherwise – can be predicted (to some extent) and
managed (also to some extent), they are risks
precisely because they cannot be completely
anticipated or controlled. Perhaps the biggest
takeaway from this article is that we can never
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